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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT—A
CURE FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGER MARKET DEFINITION
UNDER A POST-HEALTH CARE REFORM REGIME

INTRODUCTION
With President Barack Obama’s recent appointments of Jonathan D.
Leibowitz as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Christine
A. Varney as the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the Department
of Justice (DOJ), there is much to be said about what the future of antitrust
enforcement will look like.1 Leibowitz and Varney together have set a tone of
aggressive and vigilant antitrust enforcement almost immediately.2
Undoubtedly, this is an exciting time in antitrust enforcement—at the time of
this writing, health reform recently passed, and both federal agencies that
enforce the U.S. antitrust laws are now uniquely poised to rethink the bedrock
upon which longstanding merger analysis has rested for over fifteen years.3
On October 22, 2009, FTC Chairman Leibowitz announced that the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ as well as the FTC (collectively, “the Agencies”)
would be conducting a series of five workshops focusing on possibly revising
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”) used by the Agencies to
This development was
evaluate potentially anticompetitive mergers.4

1. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era, Remarks as Prepared for the Center for
American Progress 19 (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/
245711.pdf (“The current economic challenges raise unique issues for antitrust authorities and
private sectors. We are faced with market conditions that force us to engage in a critical analysis
of previous enforcement approaches. That analysis makes clear that passive monitoring of
market participants is not an option. Antitrust must be among the frontline issues in the
Government’s broader response to the distressed economy.”) (emphasis added); see also Jon
Leibowitz, Chairman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/commissioners/leibowitz/in
dex.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Varney, supra note 1, at 5.
3. Andrea Agathoklis, In Their Own Words: Predicting Enforcement Under Varney and
Leibowitz, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 5, 6.
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf; see also Varney, supra note 1,
at 16. At the time of this writing, all five workshops have been completed. For a discussion of
which topics were discussed at each workshop, see Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Updating the Merger Guidelines: Issues for the
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welcomed by many practitioners and academics, as the Guidelines have not
seen substantial revisions in roughly eighteen years.5 This is not to say that the
Guidelines have become wholly anachronistic, as they have clearly passed the
test of time and are still broadly validated among courts and antitrust
practitioners.6 Yet, although the Guidelines have proven quite durable, the
Agencies make it unmistakably clear—stamping it on the front page of their
DOJ & FTC Questions for Public Comment—that the workshops’ two primary
goals are determining whether the Guidelines “accurately and clearly describe
current [merger review] practices,” and incorporating economic and legal
developments that have come to the fore since the 1992 revisions.7 More
specifically, the Agencies have stated that a focal issue of these workshops will
be aligning and updating market definition and concentration analysis to reflect
contemporary Agency and practitioner practices.8 This is not to say that the
entirety of the Guidelines is going to be reworked; DOJ Assistant Attorney
General Christine Varney has stated her position that
[I]f a Guidelines update is deemed worthwhile, I would not at this time
anticipate departing from some of the basic elements in the current Guidelines:

Upcoming Workshops, Remarks to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association at the
Fall Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/251858.pdf.
5. See Varney, supra note 1, at 17; see also Deborah L. Feinstein, Editor’s Note:
Enforcement Changes: Evolution or Revolution?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 5; Mark D. Whitener,
Editor’s Note: change.gov, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 4.
6. See Feinstein, supra note 5, at 5; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Enforcement Priorities in the New Administration, Remarks at the Global Competition
Review’s 2009 Competition Law Review 14 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/091117enforceprioritiesremarks.pdf (“The 1992 Guidelines have been successful
in large measure due to their acceptance by both agencies and every administration since their
adoption. The next version of the Guidelines will need to attain a similar level of consensus to be
successful.”).
7. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES:
QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/
hmg-questions.pdf [hereinafter, FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT]; see Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Merger Guidelines Workshops, Remarks at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust
Enforcement Symposium 10 (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/250238.pdf (“The lack of modern Supreme Court precedent also underscores the need
for Horizontal Merger Guidelines that accurately reflect the best economic and legal reasoning.”);
see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review: A Midterm Report, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/horizontal-merger-guidelines-re
view-a-midterm-report.pdf?n=6032.
8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC
COMMENT, supra note 7, at 1 (“Updating the Guidelines could serve two primary and closely
related goals. First, updated guidelines could more accurately and clearly describe current
Agency practice. Second, updated guidelines could reflect and incorporate learning and
experience gained since 1992.”) (emphasis added).
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the use of the hypothetical-monopolist test to define relevant markets, the use
of HHI measures of concentration to establish structural presumptions, the
centrality of the inquiry into competitive effects, the “timeliness, likelihood,
and sufficiency” structure of entry analysis, and the basic treatment of
efficiencies and failing firms. Instead, I envision potentially updating the
Guidelines to reflect the evolution of practice and advances in learning that
have taken place since 1992 largely by (1) clarifying concepts in the current
Guidelines that may not be expressed as clearly or fully as they could be, and
(2) incorporating some of the useful guidance that already exists in the 2006
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines into the Guidelines
9
themselves.

Varney’s view of incorporating useful guidance from the 2006
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Commentary”) has indeed
come to fruition, as many of the proposed revisions listed in the DOJ & FTC
Questions for Public Comment can be found in the 2006 Commentary.10
Though revisions to the Guidelines are expected by late 2010, much of the
market definition analysis within these pages should remain substantially the
same, as the Commentary explains how market definition “has become deeply
embedded in mainstream merger analysis”11 and how Attorney General Varney
stated that the Agencies do not “anticipate departing from” basic Guidelines
tenets, including “the use of the hypothetical-monopolist test to define relevant
markets.”12
This Comment will explore antitrust developments in this time of dynamic
change, not only for antitrust practitioners specializing in merger analysis, but
also for government, businesses, and consumers.13 More specifically, this

9. See Varney, supra note 7, at 10–11.
10. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 5–16 (2006) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHori
zontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf; see also Darren S. Tucker, Seventeen Years Later:
Thoughts on Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, at
1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00024.pdf
(“Many of the proposed revisions appear to have come directly from the 2006 Merger Guidelines
Commentary and should not be a surprise to practitioners.”).
11. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2
(“The Guidelines five-part organizational structure [which includes market definition as part one]
has become deeply embedded in mainstream merger analysis.”).
12. Varney, supra note 7, at 10.
13. This current potential revision to the Guidelines is also particularly interesting because
the last revision in 1992 was undertaken by a Republican administration, and now we have the
opportunity to see how a Democratic administration revises them. See Deborah L. Feinstein,
Merger Guidelines Revisited?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 8.
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Comment will focus on antitrust enforcement of horizontal health insurance14
mergers under a post-PPACA scenario (i.e., with health insurance exchange
systems) and how the relevant markets—if at all—could be sensibly
delineated.
The rampant consolidation of the health insurance market over the past
decade has led to a small number of large insurers dominating the insurance
market, leaving competition anything but robust and predicted to only
decline.15 In fact, in 2003—at a time when health insurers were less
concentrated than 2010—three or less insurers constituted sixty-five percent of
the commercial health insurance market in all but fourteen states.16 At that
time, thirty-four states had Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) scores greater
than 1800—a score which, according to the Guidelines, is indicative of high
market concentration.17

14. Throughout this Comment, primarily when discussing horizontal mergers, health plan
and health insurance will be used interchangeably when referring generally to the commercial or
government entities that sell and/or administer health policies to employers and/or individuals.
15. JOHN HOLAHAN & LINDA BLUMBERG, URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., CAN A
PUBLIC INSURANCE PLAN INCREASE COMPETITION AND LOWER THE COSTS OF HEALTH
REFORM? 2 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411762_public_insu
rance.pdf; see also Alan M. Zuckerman, Are You Ready for the Next Wave of Health Care
Provider Consolidation? (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.hss-inc.com/documents/AMZHealth
LeadersArticle_000.pdf (detailing a perfect storm of environmental forces converging to create a
wave of health insurance mergers in the near future: insurance industry consolidation, tightening
capital markets, expense increases outpace reimbursement, workforce shortages, practice
dynamics, and large number of financially fragile providers); AM. HOSP. ASS’N, THE CASE FOR
REINVIGORATING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS AND
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT TO PROTECT CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS AND SUPPORT
MEANINGFUL REFORM 4–5, 10 (2009) [hereinafter AHA WHITE PAPER], available at
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2009/pdf/09-05-11-antitrust-rep.pdf. A chart from the AHA
White Paper illustrating major health plan mergers, both consummated and attempted but later
abandoned is found, infra at Appendix A.
16. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 15, at 2.
17. Id. at 3; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra
note 4, § 1.51. In case the reader is not particularly familiar with HHI thresholds, they can be
fairly succinctly characterized. The Guidelines identify three concentration levels as “useful
indicator[s] of the likely potential competitive effect of a merger.” Id. § 1.51. Markets with a
post-merger HHI below 1000 are regarded as unconcentrated; markets with a post-merger HHI
between 1000 and 1800 are regarded as moderately concentrated; and markets with a post-merger
HHI above 1800 are regarded as highly concentrated. Id. § 1.51. According to the Guidelines,
“mergers in unconcentrated [(<1000)] markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects”;
“mergers in, or resulting in, moderately concentrated markets [(1000–1800)] may raise
competitive concerns” (depending on the increase in HHI); “and mergers in, or resulting in,
highly concentrated markets [(>1800)] raise competitive concerns, that, depending on the size of
the combined firm, are presumed to be anticompetitive.” Id.; Timothy J. Muris & Bilal Sayyed,
Three Key Principles for Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6 (Fed. Trade Comm’n
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At the time of this writing, President Obama had just signed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) into law, which was
amended seven days later by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
(HCERA).18 The primary purpose of the HCERA was amending various
spending and revenue provisions within PPACA.19
This Comment has a modest objective: a plenary analysis of the recently
passed health care reform bill and general antitrust principles is beyond its
scope; however, in the interest of a thorough analysis, a succinct background
of the material germane to the market definition discussion is included along
with additional references for peripheral research along the way.20 As such,
this Comment is organized as follows: Part I will sketch and explain the
general contours and concepts behind health insurance exchanges. This
section’s purpose is to broach several key foundational aspects that will be
referenced in Part VIII, where PPACA is analyzed, and in Part IX, where a
sensible solution for delineating the relevant geographic and product markets is
proposed.21
Part II—to contextually orient the reader—will include general comments
on the Guidelines’ historical pedigree, tracing the evolution since their 1968
inception.22 Briefly chronicling the Guidelines up to the 1997 revision, this
section will also articulate the Guidelines’ key purposes and goals.23 This
section goes on to introduce Section 7 of the Clayton Act—the chief federal

Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00053,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00053.pdf.
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
19. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENT TO HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1 (Am. Casebook Ser., 6th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010). For a
summary of PPACA, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH
REFORM LAW (2010) [hereinafter KFF CHART], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/up
load/8061.pdf.
20. The antitrust analysis in this Comment will be limited to that of the Unites States. For a
comprehensive discussion on the international antitrust laws, see generally 22 MARK R. JOELSON,
AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES,
EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Int’l
Competition Law Ser., 3d ed. 2006).
21. See infra Parts VIII–IX and accompanying text.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,101 [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES].
23. Although the Guidelines were also revised in 1997, that revision pertained solely to
efficiencies, which although significant (e.g., in merger simulation and where mergers have
vertical aspects that enable the merged firm to eliminate double-marginalization), it is not
particularly germane to this Comment. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 20.
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enforcement statute for mergers—and details the five-part process promulgated
by the Guidelines and used by the Agencies in merger investigation.24
With the Guidelines’ framework securely in place, Part III walks through
the logistical aspects of Agency merger enforcement, introducing how merging
corporations above a certain size must comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act25 and its stringent compliance timeframes for companies proposing to
merge.26 This section also broaches several key indicia and metrics used by
the Agencies during merger investigations, including market concentration,
market power, market shares, and market definition.
Part IV specifically addresses some of the key idiosyncrasies of merger
analysis that are particularly germane to health care. Though many antitrust
principles apply similarly for mergers in health care and other commercial
markets, the health care industry has a combination of several unique
attributes—including information asymmetries, complex regulatory schemes,
market failures, and effects of third party payors—that merit special
considerations throughout the merger analysis.27
Part V has two primary goals: first, to articulate, from a conceptual
viewpoint, the chief aspects of the Guidelines that pertain to market definition
analysis—namely how these facets are structured in the Guidelines and
regarded in the Commentary; and second, to articulate how the Guidelines are
actually employed in contemporary antitrust practice. The conceptual
discussion describes the role of market definition in antitrust analysis and how
the ultimate question that Agencies seek to answer is whether prices will
increase post-merger.28 This is an extremely important analysis as the market
concentration and marker power measures all hinge on—and are meaningless
without—consistently and correctly defined markets.29 Finally this section
will briefly discuss market concentration ratios, namely the HHIs, which
function as the Guidelines’ analytical core.30 The second discussion on de
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2.
25. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a) (2006)).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b).
27. See 1 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
§ 1.1 (2010).
28. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12.
29. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Monopoly, Monopsony, and Market Definition:
An Antitrust Perspective on Market Concentration Among Health Insurers, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS
25 (2004) (“It is essential to define ‘markets’ correctly and consistently, or else measures of
concentration among states are meaningless.”).
30. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12. HHI is a measure of concentration that takes into
account both market share and the size distribution of firms. Dennis W. Carlton, Market
Definition: Use and Abuse 8–9 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. EAG 07-6, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/225693.pdf. It is derived by calculating each
firm’s share of the market, squaring it, and then summing the square of the shares. Id. As a
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facto antitrust practice utilizes commentary from several experienced
practitioners as a means of broaching the divergence between what the
Guidelines preach, and what is practiced.
Part VI includes practitioner commentary as to why the Guidelines have
been so durable over the years. This analysis looks largely to the Guidelines’
resistance to over-specificity and a paucity of quantitative presumptions as
reasons for why the Guidelines have proven adaptable to even the most
extraordinary horizontal mergers.
Part VII will explore the three Agency-challenged health insurance plan
mergers to date, namely Aetna/Prudential (1999), UnitedHealth/PacifiCare
(2006), and UnitedHealth/Sierra (2008).31 This is not to say that the Agencies
have only publicly investigated three mergers throughout the years—as the
Agencies have been more aggressive in that respect—but these are the only
three that have been formally challenged in court.32 Walking through these
mergers will help expose several irreducible market definition principles that
remain consistent throughout the challenges and, thus, expose those which are
likely to remain consistent throughout a post-PPACA regime.
Part VIII will explore PPACA and the aspects that are especially germane
to the merger discussion. This primary purpose of this section is to familiarize
and orient the reader with the key provisions pertaining to PPACA’s health
insurance exchange systems that are heavily referenced in the subsequent
section. This section is intended to serve as a very brief summary of selected
aspects of PPACA, with a more focused discussion on the health insurance
exchange aspects.
Finally, Part IX will probe thorny market definition issues that
enforcement agencies will likely encounter when challenging (or attempting to
challenge) health plan mergers in a post-health care reform regime. In this

result, markets with fewer firms or markets with more firms but a few with very high shares will
each be highly concentrated. Id. Although the current HHI thresholds have been the subject of
much criticism as not accurately predictive of anticompetitive effects, this Comment focuses on
market definition and, thus, will not more than briefly discuss HHIs.
31. See Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:08cv-00322-ESH (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Sierra Impact Statement], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f230400/230448.pdf (UnitedHealth acquisition of Sierra Health
Services); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No.
1:05CV02436, (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter PacifiCare Impact Statement], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f215000/215034.pdf (UnitedHealth acquisition of PacifiCare);
Revised Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Aetna Inc., No. 3-99CV1398-H (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Aetna Impact Statement], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f2600/2648.pdf.
32. See AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 6; see also infra Appendix A. Interestingly,
the DOJ has sought divestitures of health plan mergers despite post-merger market shares being
below levels typically associated with anticompetitive effects. See AHA WHITE PAPER, supra
note 15, at 4–5, 10.
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section, sensible solutions are propounded for defining the product and
geographic markets within PPACA’s health insurance exchange system, and
whether markets can be defined rigorously come 2014, when the exchanges
This section, and this Comment
are—hopefully—fully operational.33
generally, speaks to market definition particularly from the seller’s side—
”where the competitive concern is the health plan’s market power in selling its
product” (e.g., selling insurance plans)—and does not focus on buyer-side
issues—where the competitive concern is the health plan’s monopsony power
as a purchaser (e.g., insurer buying physician’s services to provide to eligible
enrollees).34 The framework upon which this Comment will discuss possible
market definition approaches is that of hypothetical merging health plans that
are sellers of health insurance and operating within a post-PPACA health
insurance exchange system.
Admittedly, market definition is merely a starting point in analyzing a
merger’s impact on consumers, but given the current Guidelines’ methodology
for market definition, a health insurance exchange system would not only be an
issue of first impression for enforcement agencies, courts, and state attorneys
general, but would also test the acclaimed malleability of the Guidelines’
framework which has, up to this point, undoubtedly passed the test of time.35
I. BACKGROUND: HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE SYSTEMS
The notion of a health insurance exchange system is not an entirely new
concept, but nevertheless is one unquestionably on the forefront of health care
today.36 A health insurance exchange system is essentially a marketplace that
will offer consumers a choice among high quality, low price health care
options that are comprehensive and apples-to-apples comparable.37 For the

33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2010).
34. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 147
(4th ed. 2010); see also infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text (discussing how health
insurance mergers raise both market and monopsony power concerns).
35. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.0
(“[M]arket share and concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the
competitive impact of a merger.”).
36. The idea of an exchange system was prominent during President Barack Obama’s
campaign and was promoted by Montana Senator and Chair of the Senate Finance Committee,
Max Baucus. See MAX BAUCUS, CHAIRMAN, SENATE FIN. COMM., CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH
REFORM 2009 (2008), available at http://www.aanp.org/NR/rdonlyres/D277DB51-A993-4F3F8F6E-00F9B2E2FCA3/0/Baucusfinalwhitepaper.pdf. The notion of an insurance exchange
system was also endorsed by Oregon Senator Rob Wyden, in the Healthy Americans Act, S. 391,
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
111_cong_bills&docid=f:s391is.txt.pdf.
37. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FACT SHEET: USING A HEALTH-INSURANCE
EXCHANGE TO POOL RISK AND PROTECT ENROLLEES (Health Reform Issue Ser., 2009)
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unemployed, individuals who cannot afford health insurance, and small
businesses that cannot afford small group health insurance, the exchange
system is promulgated in hopes of being the long-awaited panacea by
providing an array of affordable options.38 For employees of large companies
providing group coverage, the exchange system means essentially keeping that
current insurance plan, but benefiting from added safeguards preventing unfair
and deceptive insurance practices.39 Further, the exchange marketplace makes
health insurance more portable for individuals.40 If an employee loses her job,
changes jobs, or relocates, that person (and her dependents) can easily explore
the exchange for a new, affordable plan.41 Additionally, the high quality and
low cost attribute of the exchange will act as a crutch beyond the eighteenmonth window that is currently provided by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA).42
A primary avenue by which the exchange system garners its allure is its
ability to lower health insurance costs, which is accomplished by inciting
insurers to vigorously compete for enrollees.43 Exchange systems are able to
promote vigorous competition among insurers, because the insurers’ ability to
attract enrollees will depend purely on cost and quality of coverage, not
“benefit manipulation” or the ability to attract only healthy individuals and
reject, drop, or otherwise deter the “sicker, costlier ones.”44 More succinctly,
“[t]he aim is to focus competition among plans on the price of coverage and
minimize the tendency for plans to vary benefits in order to attract healthier
than average enrollees.”45

[hereinafter CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET], available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-14-09health-fact.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Frequently Asked Questions About Health Insurance Reform, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/realitycheck/faq#i1. Examples of these deceptive insurance practices
include those that seek to limit or cancel your coverage if you get sick by finding clerical errors in
application forms. Id.
40. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Explaining Health Care Reform: What Are Health
Insurance Exchanges? 1 (2009) [hereinafter KFF EXPLAINING HEALTHCARE REFORM], available
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 § 2202, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300bb-2 (2006).
43. H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, ENERGY & COMMERCE, EDUCATION & LABOR,
111TH CONG., HEALTH REFORM AT A GLANCE: THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 1 (2009),
available at http://maloney.house.gov/documents/health/healthcarereform/EXCHANGE.pdf.
44. Id.; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET, supra
note 37.
45. KFF EXPLAINING HEALTHCARE REFORM, supra note 40.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE MERGER GUIDELINES’ PEDIGREE
The DOJ first issued guidelines for merger enforcement in 1968.46
Entirely superseded today by the 1997 Guidelines, the 1968 Guidelines
evaluated the market in which consummated mergers took place in terms of the
four-firm concentration ratio.47 In 1982, the DOJ, through Assistant Attorney
General William Baxter, issued revised Guidelines that introduced the still
functional “SSNIP”48 test for market definition, established new HHI
concentration thresholds, and included factors germane to assessing
competitive effects and likelihood of entry.49 In 1984, the DOJ again revised
the Guidelines—affording less weight to HHI concentration statistics and
tweaking the treatment of imports.50 The 1992 Guidelines also diluted (again)
the HHI threshold significance, revised the discussion of entry requirements—
partly in response to Baker Hughes,51 and implemented unilateral effects
analysis.52 In 1992, the Agencies for the first time issued joint horizontal
merger enforcement guidelines; five years later in 1997, the Agencies issued
their next joint Guidelines revisions, namely to the Efficiencies section.53 The
most recent jointly-issued publication clarifying the Guidelines is the
Agencies’ 2006 Commentary that seeks to “provide greater transparency and
foster deeper understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement.”54 Save for

46. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19 (3d ed. 2008); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 22. Each iteration of the U.S. Merger
Guidelines is available—for historical purposes—at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger.htm.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at 20,543 (“In a market in
which the shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, the Department
will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the following
percentages of the market . . . .”).
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11.
SSNIP stands for “small but significant and nontransitory increase in price.” Id.; see also infra
notes 115–22 and accompanying text.
49. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,102.
50. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103.
51. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that rebuttal
of prima facie case that merger will lessen competition in a market does not require clear showing
that entry into the market by competitors will be “quick and effective,” rather, evidence on variety
of factors can rebut prima facie case).
52. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.5 (HHI thresholds), § 2.2 (unilateral effects), § 3.0 (entry
requirements).
53. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.0.
54. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at v.
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the 1997 revision of merger efficiencies, the Guidelines have not been revised
in eighteen years—the longest hiatus since their 1968 inception.55
The Agencies’ joint issuance of the Guidelines was an effort to describe
the methodologies and standards used in applying the U.S. antitrust laws to
horizontal mergers under review.56 The primary statute on point for horizontal
mergers is Section 7 of the Clayton Act.57 The Guidelines’ aim is blocking
mergers that—according to Section 7—”may be substantially to lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”58 Section 0.2 of the Guidelines
employs a five-part—not step—process that the Agencies purportedly use
when evaluating proposed mergers.59 First, the relevant market is defined and
used to measure market concentration.60 Second, Agencies consider whether
potentially adverse anticompetitive effects might result from the merger.61
Third—the entry analysis—Agencies examine the ease with which firms may
enter and exit the market, and whether entry by new firms would mitigate or
eliminate any potential anticompetitive effects.62 Fourth, a determination is
made as to whether efficiencies may arise from the merger that would lower

55. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2.
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.
57. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). The Act, as amended in 1950, addresses
specific practices not clearly prohibited by the Sherman Act “such as mergers and interlocking
directorates.” Id.; see also Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18); FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS 2 (2007). The
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 “also bans certain discriminatory
prices, services, and allowances in dealings between merchants.” 15 U.S.C. § 18; see also
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra, at 2. “The Clayton Act was amended again in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act to require companies planning” to consummate a merger above a
certain size to notify the government prior to consummation. 15 U.S.C. § 18; see also Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18a); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, at 2.
58. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1; see
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
59. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2. The
“five-step” label can be misleading because the Agencies do not invariably apply the Guidelines
as a linear model that must always start with market definition and end with efficiencies or failing
assets. Tucker, supra note 10, at 5–6. Indeed, “[market] concentration may be uninformative in a
unilateral effects analysis, which focuses on the loss of localized competition and other
competitors’ ability to reposition.” Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted); see also Jonathan B.
Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped From the Merger Guidelines?, 33
UWLA L. REV. 3, 12 (2001) (“It is now widely accepted among economists that unilateral effects
analysis does not strictly require a single discrete relevant market to be defined with the [SSNIP]
test; demand elasticities and diversion ratios are sufficient.”).
60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note
10, at 37.
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costs and offset any potential anticompetitive effects.63 Fifth, Agencies will
consider failing and exiting assets, and determine whether the failing firm
defense would apply.64
The benefits of having clarity and transparency in the Guidelines are
ubiquitous. A chief advantage is that counsel for prospectively merging
corporations can advise clients on the analysis undertaken by the Agencies, in
determining whether to clear or take enforcement action against a proposed
merger.65 The ability to predict whether the DOJ/FTC review will result in an
anticompetitive determination comports with the Agencies’ goal of “allow[ing]
transactions unlikely substantially to lessen competition to proceed as
Another key advantage of clarity and
expeditiously as possible.”66
transparency is the ability for the Agencies to guide and educate the courts on
the right questions to ask and how to possibly answer them.67
Alternatively, Agency non-transparency in this regard can have an equally
deleterious impact, potentially cost merging parties millions of dollars, arduous
investigation-related delays, and even jeopardize the proposed merger and its
financing.68 As a result of being in the dark regarding the Agency’s mode of
analysis, merging companies can spend millions on economists and
econometrics, just to have Agency staff respond that the data is
unconvincing.69
III. BACKGROUND: LOGISTICS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have
complementary roles in antitrust enforcement insofar as their authorities tend
to overlap, but since each has developed respective areas of expertise—as well
as to avoid duplicative efforts—only one Agency will conduct an antitrust

63. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2.
64. Id. It is notable that the Agencies’ methodology of defining the relevant product and
geographic market as a preliminary step in the process comports with Supreme Court precedent.
See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510 (1974) (“[A] delineation of proper
geographic and product markets is a necessary precondition to assessment of the [Section 7
claim] . . . .”).
65. Feinstein, supra note 6, at 6.
66. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1.
67. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 9. Because of varying levels of sophistication, the
Guidelines must be especially versatile in order to be utilized by the Agencies and by the courts,
because the Agencies have an arsenal of Ph.D. economists on staff, whereas courts do not. Id.
68. Gregory K. Leonard & Lawrence Wu, Revising the Merger Guidelines: Second Request
Screens and the Agencies’ Empirical Approach to Competitive Effects, GCP: THE ANTITRUST
CHRON., Dec. 2009, at 1.
69. Feinstein, supra note 6, at 6; see also Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12. (“Guidelines could
do a better job of moving beyond the economic framework and describing to some extent the
kinds of facts that the agencies find to be relevant in their analysis.”) (emphasis added).
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investigation for a particular merger.70 For health insurance plan mergers, the
DOJ often spearheads the investigation.71
In accordance with Section 7 of the Clayton Act, in order to block the
proposed merger, the reviewing Agency must show that the merger’s
competitive effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.”72 More specifically, and with regard to market definition,
the government can establish a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger
that “substantially increases market concentration is likely to be
anticompetitive.”73 In practice, this means that an Agency will investigate
whether a proposed merger will likely lead to increased consumer prices by
evaluating the likely competitive effects on price, output, and efficiencies.74
The investigation process formally begins when the companies wanting to
merge file their Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) documents.75 HSR mandates that
merging parties in a transaction above a certain size ($63.4 million) notify the
Agencies before consummating the proposed merger, so that the Agencies
have time to analyze the transaction’s likely competitive effects.76 Parties are

70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57, at 1.
71. DOJ has led the investigation for all three previously challenged health plan mergers.
See infra Part VII, for a discussion on those mergers.
72. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J.
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art9/.
73. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 3.
74. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2–3,
18.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a; FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE,
TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE: WHEN YOU MUST FILE A PREMERGER NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM
(2008). In assessing whether a merger qualifies as above $63.4 million, the HSR Rules require
that “assets, voting securities or NCI [non-corporate interests] of the acquired person that have
already been acquired must be aggregated with those that will be acquired in the proposed
transaction. When what has previously been purchased plus what will be bought in the present
acquisition meets the size of transaction criteria, the transaction becomes reportable unless an
exemption applies.” FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE, supra, pt. V.A;
see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (detailing exceptions to the rule). Notably, on January 13, 2010, the
FTC lowered its HSR notification threshold. Compare Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 1687 (Jan. 13, 2009), with Revised Jurisdictional
Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 3468 (Jan. 21, 2010). Approved by a
4-0 vote, the new threshold for reporting a proposed merger has decreased from $65.2 million to
$63.4 million. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Announces Revised Filing
Thresholds for Clayton Act Antitrust Reviews (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/01/
hsr-safeharbor.shtm. The reduced threshold will be effective thirty days after publication in the
Federal Register. Id. This downward adjustment—the first of its kind—is perhaps unsurprising
amidst this currently anemic economy, because the thresholds are objectively indexed to the GNP
and adjusted annually, and the economy has depressed the GNP. Richard Vanderford, Hart-
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forbidden from consummating the merger until expiration of at least the initial
thirty-day waiting period—unless the Agency decides to issue a Second
Request—which gives the Agency another thirty days from the parties
“substantial compliance” to review the proposed merger.77 In order to be
substantially compliant, the merging parties are required to supply a litany of
information, documents, and databases demanded by the reviewing Agency.78
Even if the Agencies do not issue a Second Request, the merging parties must
still wait thirty days from that initial request before consummating the
merger.79
Because mergers are necessarily prospective in nature, and since it would
be extremely obtrusive to “unscramble the eggs” and separate the firms postmerger, antitrust evaluation of a merger’s future effects is impossible to
ascertain with certainty.80 Thus, because the Agencies cannot directly predict
an anticompetitive price effect, the Agencies rely on various proxies and
indicia—articulated in the Guidelines—including market concentration, market
definition, market shares, and the “likelihood of entry or repositioning.”81 The
vast majority of times, delineating the relevant geographic and product markets
is a prerequisite to reaching any of these conclusions, and as such, it is among
the most vigorously disputed aspects of horizontal merger analysis.82

Scott-Rodino Drops for First Time, LAW360 (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/
144463.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b), (e); Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1; see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1–2 (“A second request
may be necessary when it is not possible within thirty days to gather and analyze the facts
necessary to address appropriately the competitive concerns that may arise at the threshold of the
investigation, such as when parties to a merger appear to have relatively high shares in the market
or markets in which they compete.”). By and large, the consummation of proposed mergers goes
smoothly; for over 95% of the Hart-Scott-Rodino reportable transactions, the Agencies are able to
determine within the initial fifteen- (for cash tender offers) or thirty-day waiting period that the
proposed merger will not substantially lessen competition. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY,
supra note 10, at 3. In addition to information provided by the merging parties, the Agencies can
utilize “civil investigative demands” to subpoena information from outsiders. Farrell & Shapiro,
supra note 72, at 1 n.4.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (b), (e); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1–2.
80. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1; David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An Innovative
Approach to an Old Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 49.
81. Argue & Shin, supra note 80, at 49; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2.
82. Argue & Shin, supra note 80, at 49.
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IV. REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITHIN THE HEALTH INSURANCE
SECTOR
The U.S. antitrust laws apply to all industries within the health care sector,
and many apply to health care no differently than any other business sector.83
Despite several similarities, however, health care industries do “exhibit certain
unusual economic traits that must be [carefully] considered in analyzing health
care antitrust issues”; this includes the effects of third party insurance and
intermediaries, information deficiencies, market failures, a prevalence of
professionals providing health services, government financing, information
asymmetries, nonprofit firms, and regulations reflecting a particular concern
about quality.84
In addition, mergers between health plans in particular generate great
concern and scrutiny because health insurers function as both buyers and
sellers: buyers of medical services from physicians and hospitals and sellers of
insurance to consumer enrollees.85 Because health insurers wear both hats, so
to speak, a health insurance merger can simultaneously effectuate an increase
in the merged firm’s market power and an increase in that firm’s monopsony
power.86 On one hand, the market power concern is raised by whether the
merged health plan could increase premiums and/or reduce the variety of plans
offered or quality of services.87 On the other hand, the monopsony power
concern is raised by whether the merged health plan could depress physician
reimbursement below competitive levels or otherwise hamper provider
innovation by other means.88 The concern about the merged health plan
depressing reimbursement to below competitive levels is largely linked to the
vast share of patients that the health insurance firm would control (and could
poach from the physician) post-merger.89

83. MILES, supra note 27, § 1.1.
84. Id.
85. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION ch. 6, at 1 (2004).
86. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 2; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 85, ch. 6, at 1.
87. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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V. CONCEPTUAL & PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO MARKET DEFINITION
ANALYSIS
A.

Conceptual Approach: Exploring the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Market Definition

“Throughout the history of U.S. antitrust litigation, the outcome of more
cases has surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive
issue. Market definition is often the most critical step in evaluating market
power and determining whether business conduct has or likely will have
anticompetitive effects.”90
These statements accurately assert market
definition’s importance because—under America’s antitrust laws—the legality
of a business practice is frequently determined by whether the defendant
(usually the seller) possesses market power.91 A firm possesses market power
if it has “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a
significant period of time.”92 The importance of market power in the
Guidelines cannot be overstated, as the Guidelines state that their “focus [is] on
the one potential source of gain that is of concern under the antitrust laws:
market power.”93 This is perhaps unsurprising, given that a central purpose of
antitrust enforcement is protecting economic competition on consumers’
behalf, and since market power is a tool used to predict whether a merger will
negatively affect consumers through increased price, reduced quality,
decreased innovation, change in terms of service, adverse contractual
provisions, and the like.94

90. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129,
129 (2007); see also MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1 (“The relevant market is one of the most
important and complex variables in antitrust analysis.”); Stephan M. Levy, Are Relevant Markets
Ever Irrelevant? 2 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00020, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/com
ments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm (“The issue of the relevant market is particularly
important. Many antitrust cases—both merger and non-merger—are decided by the outcome of
how the relevant market is defined.”). But see Robert H. Gertner & Kevin M. Murphy,
Comments on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6–7 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00021, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm (“Market definition should
never play a pivotal role, in the sense that the result of market definition only is the basis for
concluding that a merger is likely to reduce competition.”).
91. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1.
92. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.1; see
also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1 (“The
core concern of the antitrust laws, including as they pertain to mergers between rivals, is the
creation or enhancement of market power.”) (emphasis added).
93. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.1.
94. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.3; see also AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 1–2.
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In antitrust parlance, a market is comprised of a collection of products and
geographic locations—hence, the product market and geographic market
dichotomization—that are delineated in an effort to infer a firm’s market
power and the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger.95 “The
ultimate purpose for defining a relevant market is not to identify particular
products or geographical areas, but to identify those competitors of a firm (or
group of firms acting concertedly) that could prevent the firm or firms from
exercising market power by raising price.”96 Knowing where a firm’s
competition occurs helps identify whether there are competitive forces that
could constrain the merged firm’s ability to exercise market power (e.g.,
inflating price of health insurance premiums and reduced quality of
coverage).97 Once the relevant market is defined, that information can then be
used in calculating the relative size distribution for firms operating in the same
product and geographic market(s) (typically quantified as market shares).98
From these market concentration statistics, the Agencies can then determine
the firm’s market share, from which the firm’s market power may be
inferred—along with associated structural presumptions.99 In other words,
market definition statistics strongly influence market concentration statistics,
which determine market share, which then determine market power. As is
discussed infra, high market shares typically indicate the presence of market
power, and the opposite a lack thereof.100
The necessity of defining the relevant product and geographic markets
arises from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which requires that “substantiality”
be measured “over a line of commerce and section of the country—in other

95. Baker, supra note 90, at 130; see infra notes 101–27 and accompanying text, for brief
discussion of competitive effects.
96. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1.
97. Richard Gilbert & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Comments on Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment
No. 545095-00014, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/
index.shtm.
98. Baker, supra note 90, at 130.
99. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 1; see also MILES, supra note 27, § 2.3
(“Although market power can be proven in several ways, including demand and supply
elasticities, reduced output, persistent supracompetitive prices or margins, persistent price
discrimination, and persistent supracompetitive profitability, it usually is inferred from the
defendant’s market share and significant entry and expansion barriers.”) (footnote omitted).
100. Baker, supra note 90, at 130. But this is not always the case. See MILES, supra note 27,
§ 1.4 (“[A]lthough market share and market concentration are important indicia of market power,
they are not sufficient to prove market power by themselves.”); see, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v.
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A defendant’s high
share is only a presumptive basis for inferring market power (entry barriers to the market may be
very low); but a low share is almost always an indication that the defendant lacks market power.”)
(emphasis added).
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words, a relevant market.”101 Because the string of computations ultimately
trying to predict market power are a function of market definition, it is
especially critical that markets be sensibly defined, as the market power metric
is meaningless if the relevant markets are erroneously or arbitrarily defined.102
If one defines the market too narrowly, market shares likely will be artificially
high; if defined too broadly, the market shares will likely be artificially diluted
and low—potentially masking a firm’s market power.103
Market power may “substantially lessen competition” in two ways—
through coordinated effects or unilateral effects.104 Coordinated effects pose a
threat when a merger would increase the chance that post-merger, competitors
will either expressly or tacitly coordinate their pricing or other competitive
actions.105 Alternatively, competition can be lessened by unilateral effects—if
the merger creates a likelihood that the merged firm, acting on its own (not
coordinating with other rival firms), would increase prices or otherwise
exercise greater market power than pre-merger.106 It may be helpful to think of
these competitive effects (viz. unilateral and coordinated) as the “main course”
and market definition as the “hors d’oeuvre” in the merger evaluation
dinner.107
1.

Market Definition: Demand (Buyer) Substitution, Juxtaposed with
Supplier (Seller) Substitution

Courts have repeatedly stressed that market definition should focus on
demand (buyer) substitution, as opposed to supply (seller) substitution.108 As a
rule of thumb, “[t]he exercise of market power requires that the firm or firms
involved (collectively) face a relatively inelastic demand curve for a product at

101. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 13; see also Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
102. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 29, at 26.
103. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Comments of J. Gregory Sidak and David
J. Teece 9 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public
Comment No. 545095-00025, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontal
mergerguides/index.shtm.
104. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17.
105. Id.; see also Aileen Thompson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Analysis at the Federal
Trade Commission: Two Recent Retail Cases 1 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/thomp
smerg.pdf (“A merger may enhance the ability to coordinate by reducing the number of
independent competitors.”).
106. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17.
107. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 5.
108. Baker, supra note 90, at 132; see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
(Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). This Comment will exclusively focus on demand
substitution, as this is the prevailing economic force that market definition is employed to account
for today. Baker, supra note 90, at 132. For a discussion on supply substitution and its
shortcomings in the market definition analysis, see id.
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pre-merger prices.”109 This demand curve is important because it is only when
that curve is relatively inelastic can it be profitable for a firm or firms to
simultaneously raise price by reducing output.110 Thus, the focal issue
becomes which products would be acceptable alternatives from the buyer’s
perspective.111 Accordingly, in 1956, the United States Supreme Court in E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane Case) held that the relevant product
market consists of goods “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes.”112 In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Rome
Cable), eight years later, “the Supreme Court confirmed that market definition
turned solely on buyer substitution possibilities . . . .”113 The DOJ and FTC
have followed suit, as the 1992 Guidelines “focus[] solely on buyer
substitution factors”—i.e., possible consumer responses—and promulgate the
infamous “hypothetical monopolist” test, which focuses on demand
structure.114
2.

Conceptual Approach: Market Definition and the Hypothetical
Monopolist “SSNIP” Test

Absent direct evidence of anticompetitive effects spawning from a merger,
the Guidelines stipulate that a relevant product market is to be defined using
what is known as the “hypothetical monopolist” test.115 The test starts by
looking at the merging firms and identifying each product produced or sold by
each firm.116 Then “the Agency will delineate the product market to be a
product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm

109. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 2.
110. Id.
111. Baker, supra note 90, at 132.
112. Cellophane Case, 351 U.S. at 395; Baker, supra note 90, at 132.
113. Baker, supra note 90, at 132 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome
Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1964)). As Professor Baker explains, the Court in Rome Cable
held that market definition turned solely on buyer substitution possibilities when it defined
insulated copper conductor and insulated aluminum conductor as separate markets because of
insufficient demand substitution between the two, notwithstanding the dissent’s emphasis on the
extensive supply substitution, or production flexibility. Baker, supra note 90, at 132; see also
Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 276–77.
114. Baker, supra note 90, at 132–33. A “market” is defined as “a product or group of
products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future
seller of those products . . . likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and
nontransitory’ increase in price [SSNIP].” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11
115. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11; see
Levy, supra note 90, at 1 (noting that in many cases there is direct evidence demonstrating that
the proposed merger would be anticompetitive, and that in those instances evidence—or lack
thereof—of anticompetitive effects may render the hypothetical monopolist test unnecessary).
116. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5.
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that was the only present and future seller of those products (‘monopolist’)
likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase
in price [“SSNIP”].”117 In other words, “[t]he relevant market consists of the
smallest number of firms that, acting unilaterally or in concert, could profitably
implement a small but significant and non-transitory price increase above the
competitive level.”118 Because the relevant market largely depends on
consumer alternatives and substitutes, the relevant product market should
include all products or services that are reasonably interchangeable to
consumers; this substitutability is most often (and easily) demonstrated through
cross-elasticities of demand or diversion ratios.119 If a SSNIP would be
unprofitable, that is, if buyers would substitute other products or locations if
faced with a SSNIP, then the candidate market is too narrow.120 If the
candidate market is found to be too narrow, the test “iteratively broadens the
candidate market [for each product or location] by adding the next-best
substitute.”121 The next-best substitute is the product accounting for the largest
“diversion of demand” (i.e., diversion ratio) in response to a SSNIP.122
“The relevant geographic market . . . is the geographical area in which the
relevant seller [usually the defendant] operates and the area to which customers
could and would turn to purchase the product if the seller attempted to increase
its price.”123 As a relevant geographic market is comprised of the firms that
could collectively raise prices in a profitable manner, this consideration turns
on whether customers would travel further to seek alternative sellers, thereby,
rendering the price increase unprofitable.124 Ultimately, “[a] relevant product
market emerges as the smallest group of products that satisfies the hypothetical
monopolist test.”125
The Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test is conceptually
straightforward, but at times complicated and coarse in its market definition
methodology. The test is most easily applied in determining markets for
117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.1.
118. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1.
119. Id.
120. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.0; Baker,
supra note 90, at 133.
121. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 6.
122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 6 n.9.
123. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1.
124. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4,
§ 1.21 (“[T]he Agency will delineate the geographic market to be a region such that a
hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at
locations in that region would profitably impose at least a ‘small but significant and
nontransitory’ increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for all products produced
elsewhere.”).
125. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5.
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homogeneous products (e.g., corn), yet grows cumbersome with product
heterogeneity or when significant geographic differentiation presents itself.126
Though the hypothetical monopolist test may seem imperfect, the Agencies
have made it clear that it is a very useful screen for clearing benign mergers
and that it will not be supplanted anytime soon.127
B.

Practical Approach: Exploring the De Facto Implications of Market
Definition

Although the Guidelines have proven to be an exceptionally durable tool
over the past eighteen years,128 the current practice and mode of analysis has
evolved, making this an opportune time to refine and tweak the Guidelines to
reflect current practice and analysis.129 As previously mentioned in the
Introduction, a primary objective of the Agencies’ Questions for Public
Comment initiative is determining whether the Guidelines accurately and
clearly describe contemporary Agency review practices.130 As Paul T. Denis,
former counselor to the DOJ Assistant Attorney General-Antitrust Division,
stated, “[T]here’s a big gap . . . between what the agencies are doing and what
is on paper in the Guidelines.”131 If the eighty-plus comments submitted by
practitioners in response to the Questions for Public Comment are any
indication, there are several aspects of the Guidelines that practitioners,
economists, and industry groups feel do not accurately and clearly describe
current practices.132

126. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 2.
127. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT,
supra note 7, at 1 (“The Agencies anticipate retaining the basic ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test
used to ensure that antitrust markets are not unduly narrowly defined.”).
128. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 54–55
(2007) (“The current merger policy of the United States is fundamentally sound. . . . There is
general consensus that the Merger Guidelines have acted as the ‘blueprint[] for the architecture’
of merger analysis and, overall, provide a guide that ‘functions well.’ The Guidelines have had a
significant influence on judicial development of merger law, which is reflected in their
widespread acceptance by the courts as the relevant framework for analyzing merger cases.
Conversely, the courts have occasionally influenced how the agencies have revised the
Guidelines. The Guidelines have also provided useful guidance and transparency to the business
community and antitrust bar.”) (footnotes omitted).
129. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 8–9.
130. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT,
supra note 7, at 1.
131. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 10–11.
132. Id. at 8–9 (“[D]ue to the widening gap between the Guidelines and actual agency
practice today, the Guidelines are no longer effective in meeting that fundamental purpose [of
informing the bar as to how the agencies are going to analyze mergers].”). Practitioner comments
are located on the FTC website, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/in
dex.shtm and http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm.
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In today’s antitrust practice, the Guidelines’ promulgated methodology is
rarely followed in market definition.133 Most of the time, “market definition
revolves around the identification of all products that share with the merging
firms’ products a common set of attributes which are believed to be valued by
customers”—not proceeding by next-best substitute.134 In practice, the
plaintiff (often the Agencies or state attorneys general), will attempt to
minimize the geographic area and quantity of products in the relevant market,
while the defendant will argue just the opposite, largely in an effort to dilute
This is because
the Agency-calculated post-merger market power.135
generally, “firms with small market shares have little ability to influence the
market price—that is exercise market power.”136 Conversely, firms with large
market shares are capable of influencing market price.137 For example, a
health insurance firm with a commanding share of the market—that is, many
enrollees, would likely be able to unduly depress physician reimbursement
rates—as physicians would have no choice but to acquiesce for fear of losing a
substantial portion of business. In a narrowly-defined market, however,
because there are fewer firms comprising the relevant market, those firms will
necessarily have larger market shares than in a more inclusive market.138
When faced with accusations of antitrust violations, firms will relentlessly
contend that they have small market shares so to avoid the potential restrictions
of their market power.139 This is why antitrust cases often turn on relevant
market delineation.140 With both parties pulling in different directions to
define what is in and what is out of the relevant market, it is not difficult to
imagine how the end result could strangely resemble “economic
gerrymandering.”141 For the Guidelines to be truly meaningful, they must
inform members of the bar how the Agencies will analyze proposed mergers

133. Gopal Das Varma, Comment Containing Suggested Revision to 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines Regarding the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Purposes of Market Definition 9
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment
No. 545095-00029, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/
index.shtm.
134. Id. (emphasis in original).
135. Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines:
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 464, 464 (1983).
136. Levy, supra note 90, at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Harris & Jorde, supra note 135. Interestingly, firms will sometimes argue for narrowing
the relevant geographic and product markets. In a merger of A and B, A could argue for such a
narrow market that would place A and B in separate and distinct relevant markets, thus since they
are not competitors, the merger—in theory—could not amplify A’s market power. See MILES,
supra note 27, § 2:4.
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and literally become the outline that Agency staff use in gathering information
that will support their ultimate recommendations on a proposed merger’s likely
competitive effects.142
VI. WHY HAS THE 1992 GUIDELINES MARKET DEFINITION FRAMEWORK BEEN
SO DURABLE?
The 1992 market definition methodology and the Guidelines as a whole
have been so durable over the years because of, in a word: flexibility.143 The
Guidelines are not over-specific insofar as they provide a flexible framework
that can accommodate the substantial empirical inquiry that antitrust analysis
inherently requires.144 It would be arduous and likely unworkable to posit a
rigid, quantitative approach to market definition that could yield to the
seemingly infinite amalgamation of idiosyncratic merger scenarios.145 After
all, the Guidelines “do not, indeed cannot, explain the precise analysis to be
undertaken in each investigation.”146
Because the current market definition methodology remains a robust tool
for initially screening for market concentration and determining whether firms
fall within any safe harbors, I focus not on revamping market definition to
accommodate health plan mergers under an exchange system, but on asking
the right questions.147 These are questions that can be asked and answered by
the Agencies with staffs of Ph.D. economists, but also by judges and attorneys

142. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 8–9.
143. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 17, at 2.
144. Id. at 2–3; see also Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12. (“The current Guidelines have lasted
longer than probably any of us expected, and that has conferred significant benefits on the
agencies and the bar in terms of consistency and a greater meeting of the minds in terms of how
to do most merger analysis. As you go into more detail on the examples and specific models, you
are going to make it far more difficult to come up with a durable document.”) (emphasis added).
145. See Gertner & Murphy, supra note 90, at 2 (“Virtually every market and therefore every
merger investigation has idiosyncratic institutional, technological, environmental, and data
availability features that determine the best approach to a competitive effects analysis.”).
146. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 17, at 3.
147. Feinstein, supra note 13 at 12.
[T]he Guidelines and any associated commentary can serve a useful purpose for both
courts and government agencies by specifying what are the right questions to ask, how
might one answer those questions, and what are some safe harbors.
....
. . . Although market definition is often just the first step in an analysis, it can be a useful
one. For example, if you define a market and then calculate market shares, there would
be some cases where you could dismiss the possibility of anticompetitive harm from a
merger immediately. It is very valuable to firms to have some confidence that if they fall
in a safe harbor that their case will be handled expeditiously and there won’t be any
surprises.
Id. at 9, 13 (emphasis added).
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without advanced economics degrees.148 After all, much of the reason for the
durability of market definition is that—though occasionally coarse—it is a
very practical procedure that businesspeople can perform in an hour or two.149
A non-economist businessperson can reason that if the widget market is
comprised of companies A and B, it is highly concentrated and subject to
Agency challenge, whereas if comprised of companies A, B, C, and D, the
transaction would likely be cleared.150
Undoubtedly, a market can be defined rigorously with the right
quantitative information, but that information is usually unavailable.151 A
leading antitrust economist notes that:
[I]f one knows the structure of demand for a product and all its substitutes,
knows the cost curves of firms that currently produce (or could produce) the
product, and knows the game that describes the competitive environment (e.g.,
static Cournot, static Bertrand, dynamic trigger strategies), then one can write
down a model whose equilibrium reflects the outcome of all these economic
152
forces.

The realization of how demanding a task this is drives Agencies and
practitioners to use proxies like market share (via market definition) to
compute a firm’s market power.153 Without a tool like market definition to
function as a screen for identifying mergers that will be unchallenged based on
very low market shares, the benign mergers would be inefficiently burdened by
a protracted investigation process and potentially jeopardized by increased
compliance costs.154 The three health plan merger challenges to date: Aetna–
Prudential, UnitedHealth–PacifiCare, and UnitedHealth–Sierra, epitomize how

148. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12 (“[The] Guidelines need to serve their constituencies—
agency and party lawyers, economists, business people, and the courts.”); see also Richard
Brunell, Am. Antitrust Inst., Comments of the American Antitrust Institute 3–4 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No.
545095-00023, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/
index.shtm (“It is especially important that the application of merger controls be explainable to
the public in a way that resonates with common sense rather than the esoteric language of highly
technical merger experts.”).
149. Feinstein, supra note 5, at 6.
150. Id.
151. Carlton, supra note 30, at 1.
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id.
154. Marius Schwartz & George Rozanski, Comments on Potential Revisions to the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00019, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm. In fact, an Agency Second Request can in
itself cost a company millions and even jeopardize financing for the transaction. See Leonard &
Wu, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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flexible and valuable the Guidelines’ market definition framework can be
when dealing with complex and idiosyncratic horizontal mergers.155
VII. EXPLORING THE THREE AGENCY-CHALLENGED HEALTH PLAN MERGERS
TO DATE
Often claimed to be the result of rising health care costs, the health
insurance industry has rampantly consolidated in recent years.156 From 1993
to 2009, the DOJ has publicly investigated thirty-four major health mergers.157
In 2004 and 2005 alone, there were a total of twenty-eight health insurance
plan mergers—resulting in an approximate value of $54 billion.158 Of all the
substantial health insurance mergers to date, the government has only formally
challenged three of them.159 The first challenge to a proposed health plan
merger—occurring after a string of sizeable, unchallenged mergers160—was
Aetna Incorporated (“Aetna”) acquiring Prudential Insurance Company of
America (“Prudential”).161 As will become apparent in this section, the use of
metropolitan statistical areas (“MSAs”) or even zip codes have become widely
accepted practices for more rigorously delineating geographic markets, as
opposed to being constrained by choosing one particular state over another.162
Since health insurance is administered on a state-by-state basis, it may be seem
sensible to name a particular state as the relevant geographic market; however,
because health insurance plans often concentrate their business within certain
parts of the state, this could skew market concentrations—making the insurer’s
market concentration appear erroneously low.163 These market concentrations
are one reason why MSAs and zip codes provide for more rigorous market

155. See discussion infra Part VII.
156. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 18.
157. See id. at 6; see also infra Appendix A (chart depicting major health plan mergers).
158. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 18.
159. See Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31;
Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31.
160. Robert E. Bloch, Is What’s Past Prologue? The Evolution of Antitrust Enforcement
Against Health Plans and Likely Enforcement Policies in the Obama Administration 2 (2009) (on
file with author). In 1998, Aetna Inc. acquired NYLCare for $1.05 billion, and earlier in 1996,
Aetna acquired USHealthcare for nearly $9 billion. Both mergers were consummated without
significant opposition, as neither prompted a Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request. Id.
161. Complaint at 1, United States v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3-99 CV 1398-H (N.D. Tex. June 21,
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2500/2501.pdf [hereinafter Aetna
Complaint] (Aetna acquisition of Prudential).
162. Promulgated by the United States Department of Commerce, Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) are defined by the U.S. Census so that institutions and individuals gathering
statistics on urban areas can use a common definition. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 85, app. C, at C-4.
163. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 29, at 27.
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delineation.164 The subsequent section will describe the three Agencychallenged mergers and detail key points of Agency analysis—particularly
how they pertain to market definition.
A.

Challenged Merger Between Aetna & Prudential

On December 9, 1998, Aetna entered into an acquisition agreement with
Prudential to purchase Prudential’s health insurance segment for $1 billion.165
Under the terms of the agreement, Aetna would acquire a substantial share of
Prudential’s assets pertaining to the issuing, selling, and administering of
group Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) and HMO Point of Service
(“HMO-POS”) plans.166 At that time, Aetna was the largest health insurance
company in the United States, amassing in excess of $14 billion in revenues
and totaling 15.8 million enrollees in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia.167 Prudential was substantially smaller, coming in at ninth largest,
amassing approximately $7.5 billion in revenue and totaling 4.9 million
enrollees in twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia.168 After months
of investigation—and after examining approximately forty different
geographic markets—the DOJ alleged the product market to be the sale of
HMO and HMO-POS plans.169 The relevant geographic markets were the
Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston MSAs.170 In the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA, the
DOJ alleged that Aetna currently had a 26% market share of the HMO and
HMO-POS enrollees and that post-merger (i.e., once Prudential is acquired)
would have a 42% market share of the same.171 In the Houston MSA, the DOJ
alleged that Aetna—currently having a 44% market share—would have a 63%
post-merger market share.172

164. Id.
165. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 3. The $1 billion purchase price consisted of “$465
million in cash, $500 million in three-year promissory notes, $15 million in cash payable under a
Coinsurance Agreement, and $20 million in cash to be paid under [a] Risk-Sharing Agreement.”
Id.
166. Id. at 3–4. The primary difference between HMO and HMO-POS plans is that HMO
members cannot see out-of-network providers (except extraordinary circumstances), whereas
HMO-POS members can see out-of-network providers (albeit at greater cost). Id. at 5. There are
also other smaller differences, like how HMOs require physical referrals, and HMO-POS plans
allow for self-referral. Id.
167. Id. at 1, 3; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 3.
168. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 1, 3.
169. Id. at 2; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 3.
170. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 2.
171. Id. at 7. At the time, Prudential had a 16% market share of the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA
for HMO and HMO-POS enrollees. Id.
172. Id. At the time, Prudential had a 19% market share of the Houston MSA for HMO and
HMO-POS enrollees. Id.
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In the Complaint, the DOJ took a relatively innovative position on market
definition. Even though Aetna and Prudential both offered HMO, POS, and
Preferred Provider Organization (“PPO”) plans, the DOJ attempted to define
an HMO-only market (more specifically an HMO and HMO-POS market).173
The DOJ alleged that HMOs were distinct from PPOs, because—unlike
PPOs—HMOs differed in terms of “structure, price, licensing requirements,
Further, HMOs emphasized health
and benefit configurations.”174
maintenance, but restricted patients’ treatment options, precluded access to
out-of-network providers, and required patients to obtain a referral from their
primary care physician (i.e., gatekeeper) before visiting a specialist.175 The
DOJ’s market definition position here was particularly novel because defining
a circumscribed, HMO-only market starkly contrasted with numerous court
decisions that—for the most part—defined relevant product markets to include
all health-care financing.176
The Aetna–Prudential Complaint and Competitive Impact Statement both
failed to present any findings that quality or quantity of physician services or
reimbursement rates would decline below competitive levels post-merger.177
Additionally, there also was evidence that it would not be difficult for
physicians to get on board with other health plans or persuade patients to do
the same; this was primarily because many physicians already had contracts
with alternative health plans and many employers (74% in Dallas) offered

173. Id. at 6. The primary difference between HMO and PPO plans is the fact that HMO
members are restricted to service from the in-network physicians, whereas PPO members can
seek care outside of the network’s preferred provider list. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 643 (Am. Casebook Ser., 6th ed. 2008).
174. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 5.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1409–10 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996) (reversing district court
decision upholding a jury verdict based on an HMO-only product market on grounds HMOs
compete with other types of health care financing); Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med.
Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 308 n.15 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Marshfield Clinic in finding that
PPOs compete with HMOs and other managed care and non-managed care plans, “all of which
are substitutable”); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993)
(rejecting HMO-only market and recognizing market including all health insurance coverage; fact
that HMOs are less expensive than other forms of health care financing does not mean HMOs
constitute a separate market, because the difference in cost may be offset “by the limits placed on
the patient’s choice of doctors”). For a thorough listing of other relevant decisions, see Bloch,
supra note 160, at 3 n.5, 4. The DOJ also took a second novel position in alleging that the merger
would result in Aetna obtaining monopsony power (i.e., Aetna would obtain buyer’s side market
power with regard to purchasing physician’s services), but such is outside the scope of this
article. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 8–11.
177. See Aetna Complaint, supra note 161; Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31; Bloch,
supra note 160, at 5.
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employees a choice of more than one plan.178 Despite this peculiar dearth of
evidence, Aetna was required to divest its interests in the Houston and Dallas
NYLCare operations to assuage the DOJ’s anticompetitive concerns.179 The
divestitures included 260,000 HMO and HMO-POS enrollees in Houston, and
another 167,000 of the same in Dallas; a grand total of nearly 430,000 covered
lives.180
B.

Challenged Merger Between UnitedHealth Group & PacifiCare

The second health plan merger challenge came in 2005, when the DOJ
brought an enforcement action seeking to enjoin UnitedHealth Group
(“UnitedHealth”) from acquiring PacifiCare’s health insurance-related
assets.181 When the proposed merger was announced, UnitedHealth—one of
the nation’s largest health insurers—had 55 million insured nationwide, and
PacifiCare had approximately 13 million insured in assorted western states.182
In 2004, at the time of the merger, UnitedHealth reported revenues in excess of
$37 billion and PacifiCare reported revenues of $12.2 billion.183 The
acquisition price for PacifiCare was just over $8 billion.184
The DOJ challenged the proposed merger based on two allegations, the
first being particularly germane to this article. First, the DOJ alleged that the
merger would “substantially lessen competition in the sale of commercial
health insurance to small-group employers in Tucson, Arizona . . . .”185 In this
Tucson market of commercial health insurers to small-group employers,
UnitedHealth and PacifiCare are, respectively, the second and third largest in
the Tucson MSA—UnitedHealth’s market share being approximately 16% and
PacifiCare’s approximately 17%.186 The DOJ’s second anticompetitive
allegation was that UnitedHealth would be in a post-merger position to
exercise monopsony power over physicians insofar as it would be able to
“unduly depress physician reimbursement rates . . . likely leading to a

178. Bloch, supra note 160, at 5–6.
179. Revised Final Judgment at 1–2, 6, United States v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3-99 CV 1398-H
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f214700/214734.htm.
180. Id.; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 6.
181. Complaint at 1, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:05-cv-02436 (D.D.C.
Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter PacifiCare Complaint], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f213800/213815.pdf.
182. At the time of the proposed merger, PacifiCare had enrollees in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Id.; see supra notes 85–89 and
accompanying text, for discussion on monopsony power.
183. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 3.
184. PacifiCare Complaint, supra note 181, at 4.
185. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4.
186. PacifiCare Complaint, supra note 181, at 7.
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reduction in quantity or degradation in the quality of physician services.”187 In
other words, because of UnitedHealth’s lucrative post-merger position,
physicians would be unable to reject adverse contract terms because of the
prospect of physicians losing a substantial portion of their client base.188
The government, in defining the relevant product market to be the sale of
commercial health insurance to small-group employers, is of particular
significance because of how the commercial health insurance market was
dichotomized into large and small group employers.189 In doing so, the
government introduced several considerations that it believed sufficiently
differentiated the two and justified the market circumscription: “Unlike largergroup employers, small-group employers cannot feasibly self fund their
employees’ health benefits. They do not have a sufficient employee
population across which they can spread financial risk . . . .”190 Because the
small-group employers could not spread the financial risk, self funding was not
a viable option for the employer.191 Therefore, because self funding was not a
viable option for small-group employers, these employers—referring to the
SSNIP analysis—“would not switch to self funding in sufficient numbers to
make a small but significant increase in the price of fully-insured health plans
to all small-group employers unprofitable.”192 Accordingly, the government
delineated the product market as the sale of commercial health insurance to
small-group employers.193
Another consideration weighing in favor of the small-group employer
delineation is the difference in the way in which commercial health insurance
products are regulated, bought, and sold by large and small-group
employers.194 Many states have regulations for commercial health insurance
that are applicable only to small-group employers.195 Further, large employers
have leverage and the ability to negotiate over price and contract terms, which
often results in large employers paying different prices than others, whereas
small groups are on more of a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and often have to accept
or reject the insurer’s publicly advertised price.196
The geographic market definition in UnitedHealth–PacifiCare was
seemingly more straightforward than the product market definition. The

187. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 8.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. In Arizona, for example, a small group employer is one having two to fifty
employees. Id.
196. Id. at 4–5.
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government—like in Aetna and Sierra—reasoned that because “[h]ealth
insurance plan enrollees seek relationships with physicians and other health
care professionals and institutions that are located in the metropolitan area in
which they live and work,” the relevant geographic market was no broader
than the Tucson, Arizona MSA.197 As a remedy, UnitedHealth was required to
divest enough small-group contacts to make its market share roughly the same
as if the proposed merger was never consummated.198 This came out to 54,517
covered lives in Tucson, including at least 7,581 lives “covered by contracts
with small-group employers . . . .”199 UnitedHealth was also required to divest
either its largest contract with the University of Colorado (HMO contract),
which included 6,066 members, or an equivalent number of enrollees under
other contracts in the Boulder, Colorado area.200
C. Challenged Merger between UnitedHealth & Sierra Health Services, Inc.
UnitedHealth’s March 11, 2007 announcement that it was acquiring all
shares of Sierra Health Services, Inc. (“Sierra”) led to the most recently
challenged health plan merger.201 Sierra’s membership was concentrated in the
Las Vegas area (specifically Clark and Nye counties).202 At the time of the
transaction, UnitedHealth was the largest health insurer in the United States,
with over 70 million enrollees nationwide and revenue for 2007 of $75
billion.203 At the same time, Sierra was the largest health insurer in Nevada,
with over 655,000 enrollees and revenue for 2007 of $1.9 billion.204 This
substantial $2.6 billion transaction immediately attracted strong opposition,
especially from the American Medical Association, claiming in a statement

197. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5–6.
198. Id. at 11; Final Judgment, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., No. 1:05CV02436
(D.D.C. May 23, 2006), at 5–9 [hereinafter PacifiCare Final Judgment].
199. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31 at 10–11; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra
note 198, at 4–5. The figure 7,581 is the number of enrollees in the Tucson MSA that were
covered under PacifiCare’s “small-group contracts” as of June 30, 2005. PacifiCare Impact
Statement, supra note 31, at 11; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra note 198, at 4–5.
200. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31 at 12; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra
note 198, at 9. As stated above, the geographic market definition for the DOJ’s first allegation
was the Tucson MSA. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5–6. The reason
divestitures were required in the Boulder MSA pertains to the DOJ’s second (monopsony)
allegation (namely that post-merger, UnitedHealth would be able to depress physician
reimbursement rates because physicians could not reject adverse contract terms out of the fear of
losing substantial portions of business). Id. at 8.
201. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1.
202. Complaint at 1, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00322-ESH
(D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Sierra Complaint], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/f230400/230447.pdf.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 4.
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that the acquisition would give UnitedHealth a commanding 94% combined
market share for HMO products.205
The DOJ challenged the transaction on the grounds that the proposed
merger would yield anticompetitive effects in the sale of Medicare Advantage
plans206 in Clark and western adjacent Nye County.207 Further, the DOJ
predicted that UnitedHealth would possess a 94% market share post-merger.208
UnitedHealth contended that any attempt to exercise market power (e.g., by
attempting to raise price) for its Medicare Advantage plans would be
impossible, as UnitedHealth’s attempt “would be thwarted by the federal
government’s role as a power buyer of Medicare plans and regulator of
Medicare Advantage bid terms, as well as by entry in the area by a number of
Medicare Advantage plans for the coming year . . . .”209 These arguments were
rejected by the DOJ as it contested the merger in a Medicare market.210
Medicare Advantage plans were significantly involved, which affected the
merger analysis—specifically the product market definition. Because the
benefits offered to seniors by Medicare Advantage plans over traditional
Medicare were so lucrative, a sufficient number of Las Vegas area enrollees
would not switch from Medicare Advantage to traditional Medicare in the
event of a modest alteration to price or benefits, thereby, making a price

205. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8 (“Sierra accounts for approximately 60
percent of Medicare Advantage enrollees in the Las Vegas area. United accounts for
approximately 34 percent.”); see Small Business Competition Policy: Are Markets Open for
Entrepreneurs?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 19, 75 n.13 (2008)
(statement of William A. Hazel, Jr., M.D., Sec’y, Bd. of Trs., Am. Med. Ass’n); see also Bloch,
supra note 160, at 11.
206. Medicare Advantage plans are offered by private insurance companies. Sierra
Complaint, supra note 202, at 5. Congress, in establishing this program, intended that “vigorous
competition among private Medicare Advantage insurers would lead insurers to offer seniors
richer and more affordable benefits than traditional Medicare, provide a wider array of healthinsurance choices, and be more responsive to the demands of seniors.” Id. at 2. In fact, most
successful Medicare Advantage Plans achieve those goals. Id. at 5.
207. Id. at 1; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 12.
208. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4. Although the DOJ did not officially pursue
a more narrow product market definition, they apparently toyed with the idea of further narrowing
the product market to Medicare Advantage coordinated-care plans (MA-HMO and MA-PPO),
which in this case would have given UnitedHealth a 99% post-merger market share in the same
geographic market. Id. at 5.
209. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12. Mr. Bloch was a lead attorney involved in the merger
transaction. See Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 11. “Medicare Advantage Plans consist of
Medicare Advantage health maintenance organization (“MA-HMO”) plans, Medicare Advantage
preferred provider organization (“MA-PPO”) plans, and Medicare Advantage Private Fee-forService (“MA-PFFS”) plans.” Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1–2.
210. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12; see also Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1.
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increase or reduction in benefits unprofitable.211 Moreover, as Medicare
Advantage plans offered richer benefits over traditional Medicare (e.g., lower
co-payments, lower co-insurance, caps on total yearly out-of-pocket costs,
prescription drug coverage, vision coverage, health club memberships, etc.),
Medicare Advantage plans exclusively comprised Sierra’s relevant product
market.212
Sierra’s geographic market definition exercise was more straightforward.
Because Medicare-eligible residents in Clark and Nye counties are only able to
enroll in CMS-approved Medicare Advantage plans for the county in which
they reside, enrollees were precluded from shopping around in other
geographic areas for coverage.213 Accordingly, the relevant geographic market
was found to be Clark and Nye counties within the Las Vegas area.214
The DOJ found that in the product market consisting solely of Medicare
Advantage plans, the merged UnitedHealth–Sierra would account for a 94% of
Las Vegas’s total Medicare Advantage enrollment, which drew approximately
$840 million in annual commerce.215 The DOJ surprisingly did not allege any
monopsony suspicions, nor did it introduce the commercial insurance market
into the equation as in Aetna and PacifiCare (this was solely a Medicare
market).216 As a remedy, UnitedHealth was required to divest its Medicare
Advantage line of business in the Las Vegas area (which covered
approximately 25,000 individual Medicare Advantage beneficiaries) to an
“approved acquirer.”217 The idea was that by divesting its Las Vegas line of
business to an approved acquirer, anticompetitive effects would be eliminated
because the divested business would presumably be sold to an entity that could
vigorously and perpetually compete with the merged UnitedHealth-Sierra.218
Notably, despite the considerable divestiture, UnitedHealth was able to retain
Sierra’s 49,500 members in Las Vegas.219

211. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7. The lucrative benefits included lower copayments, lower co-insurance, caps on total yearly out-of-pocket costs, prescription drug
coverage, vision coverage, and health club memberships, among others. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 2.
216. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12.
217. Id.
218. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 9–10.
219. Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 4; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 12 (detailing
other specifics of the transaction and the consent decree).
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D. What Can Be Learned from the Aetna, PacifiCare, & Sierra Health Plan
Mergers?
The three Agency-challenged health plan mergers signal that courts are
very hesitant to broadly define the relevant market. Concerning geographic
markets—all three cases utilized one or two MSAs for geographic market
definition: Aetna’s geographic market was defined as the Dallas and Houston
MSAs, PacifiCare’s market was limited to the Tucson MSA, and Sierra’s
consisted of only two counties (Clark and Nye) within Las Vegas area.220 In
the same vein, concerning product market definition—Aetna was limited to
HMO and HMO-POS plans, PacifiCare was limited to commercial insurance
to small employers, and Sierra was limited to Medicare Advantage plans.221
This portends that under the PPACA’s health care exchange system, courts—
and especially the Agencies—will likely seek to circumscribe and constrict the
relevant markets as much as possible.
VIII. INVESTIGATING & ANALYZING PPACA
A.

Background of the Patient Protection and Affordable Coverage Act of
2010

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), was
signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010 and amended seven
days later by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA).222
This ten-titled bill is a comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. health care system,
with provisions aiming for broad-spectrum improvements in everything from
health care coverage to financing to delivery.223 In addition to obligating all
applicable individuals224 to purchase and maintain acceptable health insurance,
220. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note
31, at 3; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7.
221. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note
31, at 4; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7.
222. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
223. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001, 124 Stat. 119, 353 (“Transforming the Health
Care Delivery System”), § 1001, 124 Stat. at 131 (“Improving Coverage”), § 1413, 124 Stat. at
233 (“Health Subsidy Programs”). There are a few areas within health care that will be relatively
unscathed by the PPACA, including professional licensure, malpractice, and much of the
bioethics field. FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 1.
224. There are several exempted groups from this individual mandate, including American
Indians, members of certain religious sects or ministries that object to health insurance, and those
experiencing financial hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(5)(A)–(B) (West Supp. 2010). The brunt
of the individual insurance mandate will affect self-employed persons whose income is well
above the median. FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 74.
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PPACA incentivizes (and disincentivizes) insurers and health care providers to
deliver care as efficiently and effectively as possible.225
Perhaps the most probative PPACA Title for purposes of this article is
Title I, which addresses the initiative for patching up what has become a
fragmented health insurance industry.226 Title I contains some provisions that
have already been enacted at the time of this writing, as well as plenty of
others to unfurl in years to come.227 Title I not only establishes the American
Health Benefit Exchanges and SHOP Exchanges,228 but also includes—among
a litany of other reforms—the mandate that applicable individuals purchase
and/or maintain qualifying health insurance or face monetary penalties,229 to
provide health insurance subsidies for qualifying individuals,230 and attempt to
end or significantly mitigate the deceptive and exclusionary practices of health
insurers.231

225. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (West Supp. 2010). Any person is eligible to participate in the
individual exchange if that person lives in the state in which the particular exchange operates, is
not incarcerated (unless pending disposition of charges), and is a citizen or lawful alien
reasonably expecting to remain as such for the entire enrollment period. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 18001; see also Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational
Policy in Health Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 226–27 (2009) (discussing fragmentation arising
out of health care financing).
227. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (extension of dependent health coverage until child
reaches age twenty-six); id. § 18001(a) (Secretary to establish a temporary high risk health
insurance pool program within six months of PPACA’s enactment). But see id. § 18031(b)(1)
(health insurance exchanges to begin on January 1, 2014).
228. Id. § 18031(a). “American Health Benefit Exchange” refers to health insurance
exchanges for individuals, and will hereinafter be referred to as simply “exchanges.” Id. Further,
“SHOP Exchange” refers to PPACA’s Small Business Health Options Program, which facilitates
the sale of qualified health insurance for small group employers, and will hereinafter be referred
to as “SHOP Exchange.” Id. § 18031(a)(5), (b)(1)(B). A state may elect to merge the two
exchanges if it has adequate resources to do reasonably do so. Id. § 18031(b)(2).
229. Id. § 18091. In 2016, when fully phased in, individuals without acceptable coverage will
be subject to tax penalties of the greater of $695 per year for each adult ($2,085 per family), or a
2.5% share of the household’s income. KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 1. It is important to note
that PPACA does not require any individual to terminate their current (group plan or other)
coverage and participate in the health insurance exchange (“current” meaning that the individual
was enrolled at the time of PPACA’s enactment). 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a). Interestingly, however,
there is one group which is mandated by PPACA to purchase insurance through the exchanges:
members of Congress and Congressional staff. Id. § 18032(d).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(a). For a great discussion on the various subsidies and the terms for
qualifying for varying amounts, see FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 65–68.
231. These deceptive practices include but are certainly not limited to: underwriting based on
health status, excluding particular preexisting conditions, and cancelling or rescinding coverage
once a claim is made based on the finding of a trivial and unrelated omission in the individual’s
health insurance application. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3. PPACA now requires the omission to be
“an act or practice that constitutes fraud or [] an intentional misrepresentation of material fact as

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

1535

The idea behind the health insurance exchanges is to increase access to
health insurance by making it affordable; the affordability—in theory—will be
realized by promoting vigorous competition—solely on price—among health
insurance companies.232 Through the exchanges, the sale of qualifying health
insurance will be facilitated by how individuals and small group employers can
browse available coverage options in easy to compare, apples-to-apples format,
and select what is most suitable.233 PPACA will allow individuals and small
businesses with up to 100 employees to purchase health coverage and
businesses with more than 100 employees to purchase coverage starting in
2017.234 Small employers can be grandfathered into the small group exchange,
as long as the small group employer in the exchange expands, it can continue
to be treated as a small group employer (even if it would technically be a
classified as a large group employer), as long as it remains in the exchange.235
Funding for these health insurance marketplaces will not be borne entirely by
the states—at least not until 2015—as the federal government will temporarily
(2011 to 2015) provide “grants” to eligible states for use in implementing and
maintaining the operability of their exchanges.236 The states’ health insurance
exchanges must be entirely self-sustaining by January 1, 2015.237
At this writing, PPACA’s logistics for health insurance exchanges are
relatively articulated, but there is still much that is to be sorted out by
administrators and regulators.238 In fact, states are not even required to
participate in the exchanges.239 If a state chooses not to participate, one of two

prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage.” Id. § 300gg-12. “Such plan or coverage may
not be cancelled except with prior notice to the enrollee, . . .” Id.
232. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 37.
233. FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 114–15.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(B). Large group employers are those “who employed an
average of at least 101 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who
employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.” Id. § 18024(b)(1). Small group
employers are those “who employed an average of at least 1 but not more than 100 employees on
business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 1 employee on the
first day of the plan year.” Id. § 18024(b)(2). For plans beginning before January 1, 2016 states
can opt to substitute “51 employees” for “101 employees” and “50 employees” for “100
employees.” Id. § 18024(b)(3). This seems to be a provision that states can use as a means of
avoiding overburdening the state exchange while it is still in its infancy (hence why after January
2016—when the exchanges are expected to be at full-strength—this provision of employee
substitution no longer applies).
235. Id. § 18024(d).
236. Id. § 18031(a)(2).
237. Id. § 18031(d)(5) (“[T]he State shall ensure that such Exchange is self-sustaining
beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing the Exchange to charge assessments or user
fees to participating health insurance issuers, or to otherwise generate funding, to support its
operations.”).
238. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 4.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 18052.
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things will happen. First, the state could seek a “waiver based on state
innovation” for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, meaning that
a state could implement a health insurance model entirely different from an
exchange, as long as the state’s new schematic complies with the litany of
provisions outlined in PPACA Section 18052(a).240 If a state proceeds with
this waiver, the state’s coverage must be “at least as comprehensive” as the
exchange’s Qualified Health Plan (QHP) coverage, not increase the federal
deficit, provide coverage to at least as many residents, and have premiums and
cost sharing at least as low and to at least as many residents, respectively.241
Alternatively, if a state does not seek a waiver, but still resists setting up an
exchange, the HHS Secretary shall—directly or through a non-profit entity—
establish an exchange in the non-electing state.242 This is a strong disincentive
against resisting the exchange paradigm, as an HHS-arranged insurance
exchange would likely afford state governors much less control over how the
exchange operates and how payors are reimbursed.
If a state is amenable to establishing and maintaining an exchange, PPACA
will utilize the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with
insurers, each of which must offer at least two multi-state plans in any
exchange in which they participate.243 Under PPACA, there does not seem to
be a limit to how many states can collectively establish an exchange. Instead,
it appears that regional exchanges are legitimate as long as states can agree and
the collaboration does not violate any state laws.244 In fact, individual states
are also permitted to form their own regional exchanges (comprised of subexchanges), and states may have more than one sub-exchange operate in a
single state—provided each serves a distinct geographic area.245 Insurance
behemoths like Blue Cross Blue Shield could be prominent throughout these
multi-state exchanges, as PPACA explicitly allows the OPM Director to
contract with a group of insurers “affiliated either by common ownership and
240. Id. § 18052(a).
241. Id. § 18052(b). QHPs are discussed infra, notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A). According to PPACA, if the HHS Secretary
determines on or before January 1, 2013 that a state will not be ready to launch a fully operational
exchange by January 1, 2014, the HHS Secretary shall take necessary measures to implement an
exchange. Id. § 18041(c)(1).
243. Id. § 18054(a)(1). Though OPM also administers the Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program (FEHBP), multi-state exchange plans will be administered separately and will have a
distinct risk pool. Id. § 18054 (g)(5).
244. Id. § 18031(f).
245. Id. § 18031(f)(2)(B). The Act also requires “the area served by each Exchange is at
least as large as a rating area described in section 300gg(a) of this title.” Id. What § 300gg(a)
adds with regard to rating area is namely how “each State shall establish 1 or more rating areas
within that State” and the “Secretary shall review [for adequacy] the rating areas established by
each State.” Id. § 300gg(a)(2)(A). If the state’s rating fails here, the Secretary has the power to
establish the state’s rating areas. Id. § 300gg(a)(2)(B).
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control or by the common use of a nationally licensed service mark.”246 Each
plan must offer a benefits package that is uniform in each state in which the
insurer offers coverage through the exchange, and the multistate exchanges
must be state-established and administered by a governmental agency or nonprofit entity.247
Not all health insurance plans will be allowed to participate in the health
insurance exchanges; the only plans that may be offered through exchanges are
“qualified health plans” (QHPs).248 A qualified health plan indicates that the
plan has satisfied various requirements to assure legitimacy.249 A qualified
health plan must (A) be certified by the exchange in which it seeks to
operate;250 (B) provide an “essential health benefits package”; and (C) be
offered by a qualifying health insurer.251 A qualifying health insurer is one
that: (1) is in good standing and licensed in the state(s) where the Exchange
operates; (2) agrees to offer—in each exchange in which it operates—at least
one gold-level and one silver-level plan; (3) agrees to charge the same
premium for each QHP regardless of whether the QHP is offered through the
Exchange or sold directly to the insured; and (4) complies with Section
18031(d) requirements promulgated by the Secretary and any other
requirements established by an Exchange.252 It is worthy of note that, subject
to few exceptions, all of the “qualified” plans available in the Exchanges and

246. Id. § 18054(a)(1).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(2)–(4); see also KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 4 (Each state must
have, at least one plan being offered by a non-profit entity and at least one plan that does not
provide coverage for abortions beyond those permitted by federal law (e.g., cases of rape and
incest)).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(A).
249. Id. § 18021.
250. Id. § 18031(e)(1). A QHP may become certified by meeting certification requirements
“as promulgated by the Secretary” and if “the Exchange determines that making available such
health plan through such Exchange is in the interests of qualified individuals and qualified
employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates . . . .” Id. § 18031(e)(1).
251. Id. § 18021(a). An “essential health benefits package”—to be considered such—must
include at least the following general categories of services and cover at least 60% of the actuarial
value of the covered benefits: “Ambulatory patient services[;] [e]mergency services[;]
[h]ospitalization[;] [m]aternity and newborn care[;] [m]ental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment[;] [p]rescription drugs[;] [r]ehabilitative and
habilitative services and devices[;] [l]aboratory services[;] [p]reventative and wellness services
and chronic disease management[; and] [p]ediatric services, including oral and vision care.” Id.
§§ 18022(b)(1)(A)–(J), (d)(1). The QHP must also limit cost-sharing to the current HSA limits,
which in 2010 were $5,950 for an individual and $11,900 for a family. Id. § 18022(c)(1)(A);
KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 6.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(C).
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private small group and individual markets must, at a minimum, offer the
essential benefits package.253
PPACA has four categories of tiered benefits packages, each with
incrementally increasing coverage, and a separate catastrophic plan.254 The
catastrophic plan—only available in the individual market—is available to
those who have not reached the age of thirty or to those exempted from
PPACA’s mandate to purchase acceptable coverage.255 PPACA’s most basic
plan—the bronze plan—represents the minimum acceptable coverage; it
provides the essential health benefits package, and it covers 60% of the plan’s
benefit costs, with an out-of-pocket limit equal to the current Health Savings
Account (HSA) limit.256 The essential health benefits package and out-ofpocket limits apply to all of PPACA’s tiered plans.257 The silver plan covers
70% of the plan’s actuarial benefit costs; the gold plan covers 80% of the
plan’s actuarial benefit costs; and the platinum plan covers 90% of the plan’s
actuarial benefit costs—again, all with the essential benefits package and HSA
out-of-pocket limits.258 The aforementioned out-of-pocket limits are not static,
but are reduced for those with incomes between 100% to 400% of the Federal
Poverty Level (“FPL”).259 PPACA strongly incentivizes health insurers within
the Exchange strictly to offer the essential health benefits package, because if
states impose mandated additional benefits beyond the essential health benefits
package, they must subsidize—by making payments to the health plan on the
individual’s behalf or by paying the individual directly—to defray the
incremental premium cost that is attributable to the state’s additional mandated
benefits.260 Additionally, regarding the age rating requirements of multi-state
Exchange plans, if one state’s rating requirement is lower than 3:1, that
particular state may require other multi-state plans functioning in that state to

253. KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 6. This requirement does not apply to grandfathered
employer-sponsored or individual plans. Id.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1), (e).
255. Id. § 18022(e). The catastrophic plan includes coverage set at the 2010 HSA limits of
$5,950 for an individual and $11,900 for a family. KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5. Under this
plan, prevention benefits and coverage for three primary care visits would be exempt from the
deductible. Id.
256. Id. § 18022(d)(1)(A); see also KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that the HSA limit
in 2010 is $5,950 for individuals and $11,900 for families).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(A); see also KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1)(B–D).
259. Id. § 18071(b) (2006); see KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5. For incomes between 100%
to 200% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by one-third ($1,983/individual and $3,967/family); for
incomes between 200% to 300% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by one-half ($2,975/individual
and $5,950/family); for incomes between 300% to 400% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by twothirds ($3,987/individual and $7,973/family). These out-of-pocket reductions do not increase the
plan’s actuarial value, as they are applied within the plan’s actuarial limits. Id.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii).
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raise their rating requirements to comply with the state’s “more protective age
rating rules.”261
IX. DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS UNDER
PPACA
With health insurance consolidation still continuing at an “alarming pace,”
should PPACA survive various states’ lawsuits, it will not be long before
agencies, courts, and state attorneys general begin thinking about the antitrust
ramifications with health insurance Exchanges now in the mix.262 This section
walks through how the Agencies could sensibly proceed through this
ambiguous and thorny process, with the 1992 Guidelines serving as the
analytical underpinning, the three above-analyzed health plan mergers as
reference points, and the “practical” market definition discussion to orient the
reader.
It is important to reiterate the Agencies’ penchant for narrowly defining the
relevant geographic and product markets. Despite the fact that employers have
always been able to search nationwide for health insurance, the Antitrust
Division—in all three cases challenging health plan mergers—alleged a
relevant geographic market consisting of merely localities or MSAs.263 The
prominent and recurring rationale is that competition among plans springs
from the plans’ local provider networks; therefore, if the merged company
attempted to increase price, enough employers would not switch and insure
with more distant provider networks so as to render the price increase
unprofitable.264 The same market circumscription is present in the three
previously discussed product markets, as the DOJ narrowed the product market
to HMO and HMO-POS plans in Aetna, commercial insurance to small-group
employers in PacifiCare, and Medicare Advantage plans in Sierra.265 There is
261. Id. § 18054(c)(5); KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 4.
262. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 5 (“[Health plan consolidation] still continues at
an alarming pace with two particularly large and problematic consolidations coming under DOJ
review in 2008.”). The “large and problematic” mergers being referenced are United-Sierra and
Independence Blue Cross-Highmark. Id. at 6.
263. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 34, at 149–50 (stating that the Antitrust
Division alleged geographic markets consisting of the Dallas and Houston MSAs in its challenge
of Aetna’s acquisition of Prudential, the Tucson MSA in its challenge of United Healthcare’s
acquisition of PacifiCare, and the Las Vegas area in its challenge of United Healthcare’s
acquisition of Sierra Health Services).
264. Id. at 160; see Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8 (“[M]anaged care
companies establish provider networks in the areas where employees work and live, and they
compete on the basis of these local provider networks” such that “a small but significant increase
in the price of HMO and HMO-POS plans would not cause a sufficient number of customers to
switch to health plans outside of these regions to make such a price increase unprofitable.”).
265. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note
31, at 1–2; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1.
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nothing indicating that enforcement agencies will depart from this tendency to
narrowly define markets in a post-PPACA regime.
A.

Defining the Relevant Geographic Market Under PPACA

As articulated above, PPACA will involve states establishing numerous
Concerning the relevant
state-operated health insurance Exchanges.266
geographic market definition under this paradigm, at first blush it would seem
sensible to delineate and aggregate the states or regions in which the merged
insurance company would be participating post-merger. This would not be
difficult, because according to PPACA, each intra-state Exchange would be
operating in a distinct geographic area.267 Perhaps an example would be
illuminating. If, within a state, Exchange One operates in geographic market
A1 and Exchange Two operates in geographic market A2, then the post-merger
geographic market could be calculated by aggregating the sum of regions or
MSAs that each served: A1 + A2 = GMKT.268 This approach is consistent with
the Sierra rationale, because in Sierra the Medicare-eligible residents in the
Las Vegas area could only enroll in the Medicare Advantage plans for the
county in which they live—as a result, enrollees could not turn elsewhere for
the Medicare Advantage plans.269 According to PPACA, individuals could
purchase insurance in an Exchange, which would have the ability to operate
across state lines (i.e., regional Exchanges).270 However, the DOJ has made it
clear that enrollees do not wish to cross state lines to see their doctor—they
want a local provider network; because the DOJ has defined the geographic
market precisely this way in the previous three health plan mergers, this pulls
heavily in favor of the Agencies continuing to restrict and hone the geographic
market down to the local MSAs.271 For this reason, it seems that the most
sensible approach would be the relevant geographic market as the Agencies
have done in the past, namely “no larger than the local areas within which
HMO and HMO-POS enrollees demand access to providers.”272 Applying this
methodology to PPACA, Exchanges would result in the geographic market
being the local areas in which enrollees in health Exchange “X” would

266. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
267. Id. § 18031(f)(2)(A).
268. Under this approach, it would be wise to use either geographic regions (e.g., states) or
MSAs, but not both—as this could create confusion with overlapping markets.
269. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7 (“Because Medicare-eligible residents in the
Las Vegas area cannot purchase substitute Medicare Advantage plans sold in other geographic
areas, the Las Vegas area is a relevant geographic market . . . .”).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(1).
271. See PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5 (“Health insurance plan enrollees
seek relationships with physicians and other health care professionals and institutions that are
located in the metropolitan area in which they live and work.”).
272. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8.
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demand access to providers.273 Ascertaining the provider demand could be
accomplished by performing resident surveys, a technique stated in the
Commentary to be very useful and frequently utilized.274
B.

Defining the Relevant Product Market Under PPACA

The nature of the PPACA Exchanges and the product offerings of four
discrete and differentiated plans—bronze, silver, gold, and platinum—greatly
simplifies the process of the relevant product market. A sensible way to define
the relevant product market would be to identify and aggregate which
insurance plans the merged entity would provide post-merger, and define the
market no broader than that.275 If post-merger the merged entity would be
offering bronze, silver, and gold plans, then the sale of bronze, silver, and gold
plans could comprise the relevant product market in a line of commerce.
Defining the market in this way is prudent, as the Exchange’s strict
stipulation that insurers offer among four discrete plans would have a de facto
effect of necessarily grouping plans that have in common significant attributes
that cannot be found in products outside that class.276 For example, the
platinum plan has benefits (90% benefit coverage) that cannot be found in the
gold plan (80% benefit coverage), and the same for the gold plan compared to
the silver (70% benefit coverage), and silver to bronze (60% benefit
coverage).277 In Aetna parlance, this is to say that these plans are “distinct
products, meeting different needs and appealing to different types of
enrollees.”278 Because these plans are structured to meet different needs and
budgets, it would be sensible for each to comprise their own relevant market.
This solution is also grounded in the Sierra rationale. In Sierra, the DOJ
did not include traditional Medicare in the same market as Medicare
Advantage plans because, “[d]ue in large part to the lower out-of-pocket costs
273. Here, “X” insurance plan is referring to whatever the product market is defined as in
terms of the platinum, gold, silver, and bronze plans.
274. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 9.
275. An example of how the market could be defined more broadly would be to include the
full range of Exchange plans without regard to what was going to be sold by the merged entity.
An even broader definition would be delineating all commercial—Exchange and non-Exchangebased—insurance plans that offer the same or substantially similar benefits offered under the
multi-state Exchange plan.
276. See Gopal Das Varma, Will Use of the Upward Pricing Pressure Test Lead to an
Increase in the Level of Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 27, 28 (“[T]he manner in
which relevant markets are defined in practice often revolves around identifying a class of
products (including those of the merging firms) that have in common certain attributes that are
sufficiently valued by their consumers and that cannot be found in products outside of the class.”)
(emphasis added).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
278. See Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing market definition and why
PPO plans are not in the same product market as HMO and HMO-POS plans).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1542

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1501

and richer benefits that many Medicare Advantage plans offer seniors over
traditional Medicare, seniors in the Las Vegas area would not likely switch
away from Medicare Advantage plans to traditional Medicare . . . .”279 This
could be analogized to the tiered-benefits of the PPACA’s Exchange system
insofar as each plan offers—in Sierra terms—“lower out-of-pocket costs” and
“richer benefits” than the next best plan.280 Like Medicare Advantage and
traditional Medicare, not only do the gold and silver plans differ by cost and
benefit configuration, but they are also not seen as adequate substitutes for one
another.281 In SSNIP terms—like Sierra—because of the significant variation
in the level of benefits between different plan tiers, enrollees would not switch
plans in the event of a small but significant increase in price so as to render the
increase unprofitable for the hypothetical monopolist.282 Because the increase
would be profitable, the market need not be broadened beyond the aggregate of
the benefit plans to be offered post-merger.
Now, in the event that the health benefits plans within the insurance
Exchange were lumped into the same market as commercial insurance plans,
there is also a sensible approach. Here, the product market could be defined to
include all plans that meet a certain minimum diversion ratio threshold (which
the Agencies could supplement into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines) with
respect to four insurance plans (bronze to platinum).283 In doing this,
insurance plans sharing more common attributes would have a higher diversion
ratio, which would be indicative of which plans are seen as substitutes in the
buyers’ eyes.284 This is appropriate since the market definition exercise seeks
to ascertain whether—in the event of a hypothetical price increase—buyers
could turn to other products and/or geographic areas so as to make that price
increase unprofitable.

279. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4–5.
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1) (providing that each plan offers 10% more benefit coverage
than the next best plan).
281. Medicare Advantage benefits include “lower co-payments, lower co-insurance, caps on
total yearly out-of-pocket costs, prescription drug coverage, vision coverage, health club
memberships, and other benefits that traditional Medicare does not cover.” Sierra Impact
Statement, supra note 31, at 7.
282. See id.
283. See Das Varma, supra note 276, at 29 (stating that defining a product’s market “to
include all products that have a certain minimum diversion ratio with respect to that product” is
“based on the idea that products with fewer attributes in common with the product in question
would both have a lower diversion ratio and be likely to be dropped from the market definition by
the practical approach”).
284. Id.
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CONCLUSION
If the necessarily prospective nature of merger analysis was not complex
enough, this market definition discussion is an especially onerous exercise, as
PPACA is still in its infancy, and a considerable amount of the bill is yet to
unfurl or even be fully interpreted by scholarly commentators.
Articulating a bright-line rule for how the markets for health plan mergers
are to be defined would be exceptionally precarious, seeing how so much of
the criticism aimed toward the Guidelines includes their use of bright-line
rules, reliance on structural presumptions, and attempts at over-specificity.285
Admittedly, market definition is only a basic indicator of whether a merger
will have anticompetitive effects, but its simplicity is nevertheless a pivotal
part of its practicality. After all, with the Agencies’ modest resources, an
extensive quantitative analysis would still not be feasible in the narrowly
allotted Hart-Scott-Rodino time frame.286
A key mode of analysis that needs to be kept it mind when defining the
relevant geographic and product markets of health plan mergers under an
Exchange system is identifying the right questions to ask, rather than trying to
concoct an elaborate framework suited to the particular delivery system, as that
would analytically circumscribe the Guidelines’ acclaimed adaptability to
idiosyncratic mergers.287 While the proffered methodology is by no means the
only way that the relevant geographic and product markets may be defined
under PPACA, this is nevertheless one that is rooted in the previous three
challenged health plan mergers and comports with common sense and industry
structure. This undoubtedly is not the extent of the evidence that the Agencies
consider when delineating potentially scores of regional and local markets, as
the Agencies’ Commentary explicitly states that they rely on customer
interviews and other data for market definition information.288
In observing how the 2006 Commentary followed the Agencies’ 2004
Merger Enforcement Workshop, it will be very interesting to see if the
Agencies release additional Guidelines Commentary following the current
merger workshops conducted in 2010, and if so, how they plan to deal with the

285. See Feinstein, supra note 6, at 5 (“The bright line rules and presumptions the agencies
may find helpful in court, and that can provide some guidance to parties contemplating a
merger—may not actually reflect the nuanced manner in which the agencies actually conduct a
merger review.”); Gertner & Murphy, supra note 90, at 2 (“The Guidelines’ weaknesses reflect
the attempt to be too detailed on some issues, while providing little if any guidance on others.”).
286. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2.
287. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 7.
288. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 9
(“The Agencies routinely solicit information from customers regarding their product and supplier
selections. In selecting their suppliers, customers typically evaluate the alternatives available to
them and can often provide the Agencies with information on their functional needs as well as on
the cost and availability of substitutes.”).
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amorphous market definition concepts inherent in market definition within a
health insurance Exchange system.
DANIEL C. FUNDAKOWSKI
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APPENDIX A289
DATE

MAJOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS

1993

Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Kentucky

1995

Anthem – Community Mutual (a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan in
Ohio)
United – MetraHealth
United – PHP of Missouri
WellPoint – Group Life and Health (Subsidiary of Mass Mutual
Life)
United – PHP of North Carolina
Aetna – US Healthcare

1996

1997

Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut

1998

United – Humana (abandoned for financial reasons)
United – PHP of Texas
Blue Cross Illinois – Blue Cross Texas (formed HCSC)
Aetna – NYL Care

1999

Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Hampshire
Anthem – Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of Colorado and Nevada
Aetna – Prudential
Yellowstone Community Health Plan – BCBS of Montana

2000

Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine
WellPoint – Rush Prudential Health Plans of Illinois

2001

2002

HCSC – Blue Cross New Mexico
WellPoint – Cerulean Companies Inc. (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Georgia)
Anthem – Trigon (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia)
WellPoint – RightCHOICE (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Missouri
and HealthLink)
WellPoint – Methodist Care (Texas HMO)

2003

WellPoint – Cobalt (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Wisconsin)

2004

Anthem – WellPoint Health Networks Inc.
United – Oxford
United – MAMSI

289. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 6.
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2005

WellPoint – Lumenos
United – PacifiCare
HCSC – Blue Cross HIP – GHI

2006

United – John Deere

2007–
2008

United – Sierra
Independence Blue Cross – Highmark (abandoned 2009)
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